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Abstract: In this essay, I discuss Baumgarten’s neglected doctrine of taste. In
particular I investigate his definition of taste as the judgment of the senses against
the backdrop of the philosophical debate of his day (Muratori, Du Bos), pointing
out the biblical and classical sources of the idea of a judging aisthesis. In addition, I
analyse the radical change that the definition of taste as the judgment of the senses
brings about in the idea of both taste and the judgment of the senses with regard
to Wolff. Highlighting the link with the issue of analogon rationis and beauty, I
conclude that the concept of taste is at the core of Baumgarten’s new aesthetic
project.
I. AESTHETICS OF CRISIS, CRISIS OF AESTHETICS
At least etymologically, the relationship between aesthetics and critique boasts
a long history. In De Anima II, 5-6, Aristotle speaks of proper sensibles as
of sensibles (aisthetà) that act upon a single sense (αἴσθησις, a term also
referring to a single perceptual act) and bring it into actuality. Thus, each
sense judges (krinein) the differences in the corresponding sensible, for ex-
ample sight discriminates white from black, and is not deceived about these
perceptions, although it can be deceived about what the coloured object is
or where it lies.1 On these bases, an author like Alexander of Aphrodisias
could trenchantly claim in his commentary on Aristotle’s Sense and Sensibilia
that sensation is a judgement (ἡ αἴσθησις . . . γε κρίσις ἐστίν), not an affection
(pathos) (In De Sensu, 167, 21-22).
Aesthetic Investigations Vol 4, No 2 (2021), 201-218
Critical Aesthetics.
While the link between aisthesis and krisis had thus been established
since antiquity, it is not until the eighteenth century that the link between
aesthetics and critique was clearly made. It is indeed during this period
that critique famously moves from the philological practice of athetesis (the
expunction of spurious interpolations in a text) to the aesthetic practice of art
criticism. This transition brings along an increasing investigation of taste as
the power of judging in matters of art and beauty, which aims to establish the
conditions of validity of this kind of judgements as well as their scope. As is
well known, such a development finds one of its theoretical peaks in Kant. In
his third Critique, Kant famously contends that aesthetic judgements depend
on a peculiar, non-cognitive, mode of a higher power of the mind, the power
of judgement, rather than on aisthesis and sensibility.
The fact that the judgement on beauty rests with a higher faculty goes
hand in hand with a deep reinterpretation of the link between aisthesis and
krisis. As Kant puts it in his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View: ‘If
we regard . . . sensations as judgements, we fall into sheer fanaticism.’2 Here,
the point is not that the senses cannot be trusted, because, for instance, they
can be deceiving as in Descartes; indeed, for Kant the senses never err, for
the simple reason that they cannot judge.3 The price of the transcendental
revolution is, as it were, the stultification of the senses, which are considered
as merely receptive. Rather paradoxically, precisely in the Zeitalter der Kritik
(Cassirer), when aesthetics and criticism converge, aisthesis and krisis seem
to part ways. The link between the two pairs of terms thus seems to be only
etymological.
The thesis that the relationship between aesthetics and critique may rest
upon the link between aisthesis and krisis is all but a logical absurdity in the
eighteenth century, however. In the present article, I argue that in truth this
very thesis had been a characterising feature of aesthetics in its philosophical
foundation promoted by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-1762). My
goal here is thus to reconstruct Baumgarten’s theory of taste, which scholar-
ship has hitherto widely neglected.4 In this way, I intend to shed new light
upon Baumgarten’s connection between judging aisthesis, hence perceptual
judgement, and judging (or ‘critical’) aesthetics, hence aesthetic judgement,
making a contribution to a better understanding of aesthetics as the science
of sensible knowledge, both in its remote roots and in the intersections with
the philosophy of its age. If it is at least partially true that the Critique of
Aesthetic Judgement is a reply to Baumgarten just as the Critique of Pure
Reason is a reply to Hume, my essay could finally help to assess better the
consistency and scope of the ‘aisthetic’ project rejected by Kant, which the
crisis of modern aesthetics has brought back to the center of scholarly debate.5
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II. CAN THE SENSES JUDGE?
Baumgarten already discusses the issue of taste in his Meditationes philo-
sophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus (1735), at the end of which he
first introduces the proposal for the new discipline of aesthetics as the science
of sensibly knowing something.6 Baumgarten claims in the beginning that
the poem is a perfect sensible discourse, adding that the elements that can
contribute to that perfection are sensible representations, their nexus, and
words. In discussing the last aspect, Baumgarten assumes that the words
making up a poem are articulate sounds, hence belong to the audible and
elicit sensuous ideas (ideae sensuales).7 Their perfection in this sense is the
perfection of their audible sensations. The relevant judgement can therefore
be pronounced only by the organ moved by the corresponding perceptions,
hence by the ears. In Baumgarten’s terms: ‘A confused judgement about
the perfection of the perceived things (sensorum) is called a judgement of
the senses, and is ascribed to the sense organ affected by the perceived thing
(senso).’8 In the scholium, Baumgarten adds:
It will be allowed to express in this way le goût of the French as
applied solely to the perceived things (sensa). That the judgement
is to be ascribed to the senses is, on the other hand, clear from this
very expression of the French, from the expressions of the Jews
ta’am and reyach, from the expression of the Latins loquere ut te
videam and from the Society del buon gusto of the Italians, to the
point that some of these ways of saying may also apply to those
who speak about distinct knowledge; yet, we do not wish to deal
with this issue now. It is sufficient that it is not contrary to usage
to attribute a confused judgement to the senses – a judgement
about the perceived things.
The purpose of the scholium is twofold. Firstly, Baumgarten intends to equate
the definition provided in the main text to le goût of the French. This is to say
that le goût of the French, namely taste in a broad sense, can judge, and that
this judgement is confused, concerns the perfection of the perceived things,
and is to be applied to the sensibles, although sometimes taste also refers to
distinct knowledge in common usage. Yet, the point here is not simply to
endorse a specific definition of taste discussed in the French milieu. Rather,
Baumgarten is arguing that the definition he has just proposed rightfully
amounts to the definition of taste in the broad sense. We shall see in the
next section the momentous innovation that this inconspicuous equipollence
implies with regard to Christian Wolff.
For the moment, let’s consider the second aspect of the scholium, that
is, Baumgarten’s search for support for his thesis that the senses can judge.
As is clear, this issue is in itself rather independent of the first one. One
could admit that the senses judge, without thereby saying anything about
taste as such. Thus, Baumgarten can mention the apothegm loquere ut te
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videam (speak that I may see you) that has not much to do with taste. The
Latin adagio, which actually dates back to Plato, in the spirit if not in the
letter (Charmides 154d-155a), was made known by Apuleius (Florida II, 1)
and Erasmus (Apophthegmata III, 70), asserting itself as a sort of refrain in
the German Enlightenment.9 While the purpose of the dictum was usually to
show that the character of a person can be easily detected from the manner
of speaking, Baumgarten here draws attention to the implicit judgement of
the senses that this connection entails.
The thesis that the senses, and in particular the ears, could judge, was in
any case not unusual. Subsequently to Aristotle, this tenet enjoyed recurrent
success in different contexts, from Cicero (De natura deorum, 145-146; Orator,
150) to Augustin (De musica, III, 3.5), from Luther (Tischreden, n. 2735)
to Sforza Pallavicino, who spoke of a ‘Tribunal dell’orecchio’ (tribunal of the
ear).10 Yet, Baumgarten here intends to use such a tenet to specifically argue
that taste in a broad sense can judge, as is apparent in the other three sources
cited. Two of them are contemporary with Baumgarten: the Italian society
‘del buon gusto’ and the way in which the French use the term ‘le goût’.
For the first case, it is likely that Baumgarten alludes to Lodovico Antonio
Muratori’s reflections about the constitution of a literary republic in Italy in
terms of a society for good taste. In his Primi disegni della repubblica let-
teraria d’Italia (1703), Muratori, under the Arcadian pseudonym of Lamindo
Pritanio, had encouraged the Italian intelligentsia to found a literary republic
as a national community of scholars engaged in both the humanities and the
natural sciences. As is evident in his Riflessioni sopra il buon gusto intorno
le scienze e le arti (1708), Muratori grounds this republic on the notion of
‘buon gusto’ as ‘the understanding and the power to judge that which is de-
fective, imperfect and mediocre in the sciences and arts, so as to avoid it,
and that which is better and perfect, so as to follow it with the maximum
strength’.11 The purpose of this ‘società’ is the restauration, preservation and
refinement of ‘buon gusto’.12 Although ‘buon gusto’ serves as a ‘preceptor’ to
the powers of the rational soul – understanding, memory and will – Muratori
does not regard it as a separate faculty, but attributes it to the intellect itself
in its discriminating function. Such a conception of ‘buon gusto’ could thus
justify Baumgarten’s remark that taste is sometimes also applied to distinct
knowledge.
More proximate to Baumgarten’s attempt to make of taste a judgement
of the senses is the reference to the ‘goût’ of the French. Baumgarten may
well think of Jean-Baptiste Du Bos’s well-known Réflexions critiques sur la
poësie et sur la peinture (1719), where sentiment acts as the deciding authority
about the merit of a work of wit.13 At § 23 of the second part of his treatise,
Du Bos writes that the recipients judge a poem or a painting ‘by means
of their sentiment and according to the impression the poem and painting
arouse in them’ (305). Reason in this case can only explain the decision of
sentiment; in fact, ‘it is not up to reasoning to rule on the issue. It must
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submit to the judgement pronounced by sentiment, which is the competent
judge’ (306-307). Sentiment is here a sense without any specific organ ‘that
judges according to the impression perceived’ (308):
This sense is the same that would judge the thing that the painter,
the poet or the musician have imitated: it is the eye, when it is a
painting. It is the ear when one has to judge whether the accents
of a story are moving or whether they fit with the words and
whether the singing is melodious (307).
Taking exception to the ‘geometric critics’ such as de Chambray and Ter-
rasson, who advocated the prominent role of reason in the arts, Du Bos’s
conception caused quite a stir among the intellectuals of his day. In a long
review of Du Bos’s book, for example, Jean-Jacques Bel asks in a provocative
way: ‘Does the eye really judge a painting? Does the ear rule on the beauty
of a sound?’14
Well aware of the ongoing controversy, Baumgarten finds a firmer support
in two Hebrew terms, hence in scriptural authority. The twenty-one-year-
old Baumgarten, who had already held a disputation in biblical philology in
February 1735, was certainly well versed in Hebrew, to the point that he will
already teach a course on the Hebrew grammar, and a course on Isaiah in the
winter semester 1735/1736.15
The noun ta’am, taste, was widely spread in the theological debate of
Baumgarten’s time. As Joachim Lange, one of Baumgarten’s professors in
theology, puts it: ‘Ta’am does not only mean to taste with the tongue or
palate, but also with the mind.’16 This metaphorical extension of ta’am was
customarily used in Halle Pietism, where Baumgarten was educated, to justify
its link with the matters of faith. In particular, ta’am is the essential Old
Testament lexical reference for the doctrine of spiritual taste, namely the
sensible experience (aisthesis) of the divine things aroused by the Holy Spirit
that is necessary to get to the core of Scripture according to the forefather of
Pietism in Halle August Hermann Francke.17 Baumgarten himself will evoke
this theological sense mentioning an abridged version of Ps 34:9 (gustate et
videte quam bonus est dominus) in his Ethica philosophica as an appeal to
the reader to internally relish the perfections of God.18 If therefore it was not
unusual to make reference to ta’am in theology, Baumgarten’s move extends
its application in the direction of philosophy.19 In its sensible judging, ta’am is
not only the basis of spiritual taste, but can also serve as the root of aesthetic
taste.20
In this picture, the occurrence of the second Hebrew term, reyach, smell,
is only apparently less relevant. Suffice it to say that nasus will count in
Baumgarten’s Metaphysica as synonymous with taste.21 While reyach could
be referred to different passages linked to the judgement of the nose in the Old
Testament (e.g. Job 39:25; Judg 16:9), it is likely that Baumgarten mainly
thinks of Isaiah 11, where the ‘aisthetic’ dimension is particularly apparent.
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Isaiah 11 contains the famous prophecy where the Messiah is presented as
a shoot that will come up from the stump of Jesse. According to the New
International Version, verse 3 of this chapter reads: ‘And he will delight in
the fear of the Lord. / He will not judge by what he sees with his eyes, / or
decide by what he hears with his ears.’ The verb of the first line, though, is
translated rather freely; a much more literal translation would be: ‘and his
smelling [will be] in the fear of the Lord’, insofar as the verb waharihov (a
hiphil infinitive construct with pronominal suffix) stems from reyach, and is
halfway between a passive and an active act.22
Possible evidence as to how Baumgarten could have understood this pas-
sage can be found in his brother Siegmund Jakob, who had given a sermon
precisely on Is 11:1-10 on the first day of the year 1735, just shortly before
Alexander wrote his Meditationes. According to Siegmund J. Baumgarten’s
interpretation, the Messiah will have an unerring nose (untrieglicher Geruch)
for the good, hence a feeling or an intuitive knowledge of it. The image rests
on the reliability of smelling, probably owing to its immediacy in discrimi-
nating what is pleasant and unpleasant.23 By contrast, sight and hearing are
linked with the judgement according to appearances and hearsay, which is
typical of the ‘dysesthesia’ of the fallen humanity. In fact, our natural senses
are corrupted in their judgements because of the lack of the fear of God,
through which alone we can attain the senses trained to discern the good
and evil (αἰσθητήρια γεγυμνασμένα [. . . ] πρὸς διάκρισιν καλοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ,
Hb 5:14). It is precisely the advent of the Messiah that, on the grounds of
his perfect compliance with God’s will, is going to also ‘improve our capac-
ity of perceiving and judging (unsere Empfindungs- und Beurtheilungs-Krafft
bessern)’.24
Like ta’am, reyach too can therefore serve as a scriptural reference for
legitimising the discriminating power of the senses, both in the strict and in
the broad meaning. While Siegmund uses this broader acceptation to allude
to the aistheteria gegymnasmena in a spiritual sense, however, Alexander
views it as a prop for taste in an aesthetic sense.25 If we take this as a
hint about the way sensibility is regarded here, it is clear that it cannot be
reduced to mere passivity and receptivity as in Kant, but has an undeniable
epistemic value. Both the Aristotelian and the biblical tradition thus converge
in bequeathing to nascent aesthetics a concept of aisthesis that is knowing
and judging.
III. JUDGING ‘AISTHETÀ’
Thanks to the sources quoted in the scholium of § 92, Baumgarten has finally
made clear that it is not uncommon to claim that the senses can judge, hence
that his thesis that this judgement amounts to taste in a broad sense is not
arbitrary. What is the philosophical stake? Why does Baumgarten need such
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a diverse variety of authorities for applying the judgement of the senses to
taste or, better, for proposing his definition of taste as a judgement of the
senses?
In the following sections of the Meditationes, Baumgarten develops his
doctrine by claiming that the judgement of the ear is either positive or neg-
ative; when positive, it produces pleasure in the ear, when negative, displea-
sure.26 The more sounds are perceived as harmonious or discordant, the more
intense the pleasure or displeasure (§ 94).
The background of these statements is Wolff’s doctrine of pleasure.27 As-
suming that the perfection is true when it inheres in the object, while it is
apparent when we assign it to the object by mistake, Wolff argues in his Psy-
chologia empirica (§ 510) that pleasure (voluptas) is the intuitive knowledge
of a perfection (§ 511).28 Now, what pleases is called beautiful (§ 543); beauty
therefore consists in the perfection of a thing, to the extent that it is apt to
arouse pleasure in us. Since pleasure requires clear (and confused), but not
distinct knowledge (§ 536), Wolff introduces a notion that can grant clarity
without distinctness in beauty, that of observability. Therefore, beauty is
the observability of a perfection, or the aptitude of a thing to elicit pleasure
in us, observability being this very aptitude (§ 545). This clarity without
distinctness, though, means that pleasure, hence also beauty, can be true or
apparent (§§ 511; 546), depending on the inherence of perfection in the thing
which provokes pleasure.29 It is only the investigation of the distinct notion
of the supposed perfection that enables one to distinguish true and apparent
pleasures (§ 538).
In this context, Wolff mentions a subcategory of pleasure, namely the
pleasures of the senses (or sensuous delights), which include pleasures arising
from sensations.30 The pleasures of the senses imply that we judge the sensible
thing (§ 77) as a good (§ 558, scholium), that is, as something that perfects
our own state (§ 554). The acknowledgment of the perfection in the sensible
qualities of the food and drinks that prompt pleasure therefore depends on
the judgement of the senses, or better, as Wolff will claim in his Philosophia
moralis, first of all on ‘the judgement of taste’ (gustus judicium).31 Rather
than insisting on the peculiarity of the perceived as the object of judgement,
Wolff draws attention to the practical consequences of the judgement of taste
and touch, hence especially gluttony and libido. If we continue to desire
a food or a drink that tastes good, it is because we uniquely rely on the
‘judgement of the senses’ (sensuum judicium).32 In fact, ‘those who rely on
the judgement of the senses (homines sensuum judicio stantes) judge the
good by the pleasure they are pervaded with; and the evil by the displeasure
they are troubled with’.33 Since these people rely on their senses, hence on
present things, they tend to prefer transient over long-lasting goods, that is,
an apparent over a true perfection.
As is clear, the judgements of the senses turn out to be unreliable as guides
for human deeds. They may well be typical of children as a compass for their
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self-preservation before they develop their intellect; yet, if these judgements
are still predominant during adulthood, people remain slaves of their sensible
desires.34 Only the intervention of the intellect can point to the true goods
(the preservation of one’s health) lying well beyond the scope of the senses,
which judge positively only the perfection of the things being immediately
sensed (the taste of the beer). For all Wolff’s cogency, it is quite obvious
that the perfection of the aistheton steps out of the picture in this line of
argument. A different theoretical approach is needed to focus on this element
and develop its theoretical potentiality. This is what Baumgarten will do in
the Meditationes.
As we have seen, Baumgarten does not connect the judgement of the
senses solely with touch and taste; rather, he regards it as the judgement
of the perfection of all aisthetà; and, what is more, he equates it to the
‘goût Gallorum’. In this way, Baumgarten enlarges the frame of reference
from taste in the strict sense, as was the case in Wolff, to taste in the broad
sense. This extension leads to a recasting of the doctrine, insofar as the
discussion about the judgement of the senses no longer revolves around its
effects for our actions, but narrows down on aisthetà themselves. Hence,
while Wolff mentions the judgements of the senses at the beginning of his
practical philosophy as a threat to the exercise of our freedom, Baumgarten
places them at the core of nascent aesthetics.
The consequences of this approach will be drawn in Baumgarten’s Meta-
physica (1739; 1743, 2nd.) and Acroasis logica (1761, but developed from the
1730s). In the Metaphysica, Baumgarten gets back to the idea of perfectio
sensorum and reworks it. If perfection belongs to the aistheton, then that
perfection, whenever present, is always apparent to the senses. Now, what we
can know through the senses is a phenomenon.35 It follows that phenomenal
perfection is beauty, which gives pleasure to the one who intuits it.36 As a
result, the perfection of the perceived takes on the form of phenomenal perfec-
tion – a perfection as being observable to taste in the broad sense (§ 662).37
The connection between the judgement of the senses and the perfection of
the perceived at § 92 of the Meditationes thus becomes a connection between
taste and beauty. This makes it possible to reinterpret the very notion of
beauty, which is the object of the judgement of the senses as a judgement of
taste.
According to Wolff, beauty is the observability of perfection; in Baum-
garten’s metaphysics beauty is phenomenal perfection. What seems to be
only a minimal shift in focus actually brings about a huge change. In Wolff,
the emphasis is on perfection: the point is to establish whether a certain
perfection is true as perfection in order to be a true rather than an apparent
beauty. For this reason, it is necessary to appeal to the distinct knowledge
of that perfection to be sure that what we confusedly perceive as beauty is
actually a true beauty. In Baumgarten, the emphasis is on phenomenality:
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the point is to establish whether perfection is true insofar as it is observable.
Accordingly, appearance here is not the negative horn of the dilemma in alter-
native to truth, but the domain in which it is necessary to discriminate what
is truly perfect from what is only seemingly so.38 Baumgarten’s recourse to
the concept of phenomenon in this context thus entails a claim for a neutral
acceptation of appearance as an epistemic plane in its own right. Since phe-
nomenality as knowability through the senses is observable to taste in the
broad sense, the relevant discrimination is made by taste as the judgement
of the senses.39 Far from being defective in itself as for Wolff, the reliability
of this judgement now depends on the degree of proficiency that taste ac-
quires in the phenomenal plane.40 A mature taste will thereby judge within
appearances – within the phenomenal plane – but not according to appear-
ances – in a deceiving way. From this point of view, the yardstick of a reliable
judgement of taste is not provided by the intellect, but by a well-trained judg-
ing sensibility, as it were, by aistheteria gegymnasmena, which is the goal of
‘critical aesthetics’ (aesthetica critica).41 Any appeal to distinct knowledge
as a higher judge for confirming the truth of a given perfection is therefore
excluded: taste as the judgement of the senses will be final in beauty.
The judgement of the senses, in any case, does not only concern what
appears to the external senses. As already suggested by the Wolffian Johann
Peter Reusch, one of Baumgarten’s professors during his study stays in Jena,
the judgements of the senses are crucial to the sensuous descriptions of oratory
and poetry, where ‘one must rely more on the judgement of the senses than on
intellectual apprehension and distinct knowledge’.42 While Reusch does not
go into further detail, Baumgarten makes clear in the Aesthetica (1750) that
the judging instance must also include the inner sense,43 insofar as taste, along
with perspicacity, is ‘the lower judge of sensations, images of fancy, fictions,
etc., whenever it does not matter to beauty that the single things are judged
by the intellect’.44 As a result, it is not only the articulate sounds that must
be sensibly judged in a poem, as stated in the Meditationes, but also the
sensible images aroused in the mind of the reader. The realm of taste thus
expands from sensa or sensualia into the whole territory of repraesentationes
sensitivae.45
IV. THE TRIBUNAL OF THE ANALOGUE OF REASON
In order to fully understand the conceptual shift concerning the judgement
of the senses, it is also important to point out the innovations Baumgarten
introduces in his Acroasis logica. In the chapter about experience or empir-
ical heuristics, Baumgarten maintains that the judgements of the senses are
either intuitive, hence never false (strict sense),46 or conclusions made by the
analogue of reason (analogon rationis) on the basis of a premise that is an
intuitive judgement (broad sense). In case the judgement of the senses is a
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conclusion, a mistake is possible, not because of the senses, but because of
the analogue of reason that errs either in its quasi-reasoning or in the other
omitted premise or in both.47
The different approach with regard to Wolff is evident. First of all, while
Wolff deals with iudicia sensuum rather desultorily in psychology and practi-
cal philosophy, Baumgarten discusses them in close connection with intuitive
judgements as a technical topic of logic.48 Even if not directly mentioning
the expression, Wolff as well had evoked the judgements of the senses in the
corresponding section of his German logic, but with an unsurprisingly nega-
tive overtone (the section was tellingly entitled: ‘Wie der Betrug der Sinne zu
vermeiden’; How to avoid the fallacies of the senses).49 Things are not always,
Wolff warns, the way they appear to the senses (for example, it seems to the
eyes that the sun turns around the Earth). Just as in practical philosophy,
the judgements of the senses are unreliable and must therefore be rationally
tutored. As is easy to guess, Baumgarten takes distance from this statement:
on his view, the judgements of the senses, inasmuch as they are conclusions,
are drawn by the analogue of reason, and must be assessed accordingly.
In the wake of Avicenna’s vis aestimativa (wahm in Arabic, see De Anima
IV, 3), the analogue of reason was traditionally regarded as an inferential
power (like reason) hinged on the knowledge of individuals (unlike reason),
which is crucial to the practical life of higher animals and humans.50 Wolff
understands it as the expectation of similar cases on the basis of the senses,
imagination and memory.51 By contrast, Baumgarten, who ascribes the ex-
pectation of similar cases to a special faculty (praesagitio sensitiva52), makes
of the analogue of reason a sort of extended koinè aisthesis, outspokenly
equating it to the collection of the lower powers of the mind that confusedly
represent the nexus of things.53 Hence, the conclusion that the sun turns
around the Earth is a deception only in the eyes of reason, but not in those
of its analogue, namely of sensibility. Whenever we are interested uniquely
in the plane of appearances, the judgement of the analogon rationis is conse-
quently legitimate and sufficient.54
Given this network of interlocking concepts, the question for us is whether
the judgement of taste is an intuitive judgement or the conclusion of a rea-
soning of the analogon rationis. As is patent, the intuitive judgement of the
senses in the Meditationes concerns the perception of articulate sounds. Taste
is thus certainly based on intuitive judgements. Yet, taste can err, intuitive
judgements cannot. Consequently, the confused judgements on the perfection
of the perceived are not just judgements of experience (e.g. the sun shines),
but also presuppose another element, in relation to which the perfection of
the perceived is tacitly considered. The intuitive judgement is thus only the
minor premise of an enthymematic reasoning of the analogon rationis, while
the confused judgement on the perfection of aisthetà – the judgement of taste
– is the conclusion. What is the major premise? Since the analogon rationis
deals with individuals, the major and omitted premise, which can be wrong,
210
Alessandro Nannini
can hardly be a general rule of beauty, but is rather the timely recollection
of one or more relevant cases (e.g. artistic samples) we have encountered in
the past, which provide us with an unspoken touchstone for the current aes-
thetic judgement. It is in the space between intuitive (‘aisthetic’) judgement
and ‘aesthetic’ judgement that mistakes can therefore lurk. Hence, it is here
that aesthetic education must intervene, by promoting not only the theoret-
ical study of aesthetics, but also a long-standing frequentation with widely
accepted masterpieces.55
To summarise, on Baumgarten’s account the judgements of the senses in-
clude both intuitive and discursive judgements, provided that the reasoning
is conducted by the analogon rationis: while the former are called judge-
ments of the senses in the strict sense, the latter are called judgements of
the senses in the broad sense. The judgements arousing pleasure or displea-
sure, hence also the judgements of taste, must be counted among the latter.
Therefore, taste amounts to the sensible faculty that is in charge of drawing
the conclusion of the enthymemes concerning phenomenal perfection.56 In
this way, Baumgarten attributes to the analogon rationis a new inferential
task, the judgement on phenomenal perfection, establishing it as a faculty in
its own right.57 Halfway between Sforza Pallavicino’s tribunal of the ear and
Kant’s tribunal of reason, ‘the tribunal of the analogue of reason’ is thus the
competent jurisdiction for the judgement on beauty.58
CONCLUSION
Considered in all its epistemic assumptions, Baumgarten’s theory of taste
is much more articulated than it has been regarded so far. Engaging criti-
cally, albeit tacitly, with the biblical tradition and with seminal authors of
the early Enlightenment such as Muratori and Du Bos, Baumgarten manages
to make a series of unspoken adjustments to Wolff’s conceptual framework
that end up triggering a silent revolution. Intuitive judgements, judgements
of the senses, beauty, and analogue of reason are no longer discussed in het-
erogeneous contexts as in Wolff, but are now originally pieced together in the
theorisation of taste as the power of judging beauty. In this way, the power
of judging beauty does not reject, but rather assumes the close relationship
between aisthesis and krisis. This is not to say that Baumgarten directly
grants the senses the faculty of passing judgement in aesthetic matters; on
the contrary, he offers an insightful solution of how perceptual judgements
are linked with, yet different from, aesthetic judgements, which depend on a
peculiar enthymematic reasoning. While this solution, hitherto neglected by
commentators, could lead, among other things, to a closer investigation of
the relationship between Baumgarten’s and Kant’s positions on taste beyond
historiographical oversimplifications, it also provides food for thought to the
contemporary debate about the continuities and discontinuities between aes-
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thetics and ‘aisthetics’. Far from marking a watershed in eighteenth-century
reflection alone, Baumgarten’s theory of taste still raises pivotal issues about
the identity of aesthetics as such.
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NOTES
1See Welsch 1987; Volpi 1993.
2AA 7:145. See also the Critique of
Pure Reason, A294; B350.
3See Schwaiger 2011, 54-56.
4Baeumler already claimed that Baum-
garten showed little interest in the problem
of taste (Baeumler 1967, 87). An excep-
tion is Malinowski-Charles 2006. See also
Tedesco 2000, 141-142.
5Reiss 1997, 58. For a revaluation of
aesthetics as rooted in aisthesis, see for ex-
ample Welsch 1995; Ferraris 2012.
6Baumgarten 1954, §§ 115-116.
7§§ 91ff. I render sensitivum as sen-
sible (referring to sensibility in general)
and sensuale as sensuous (referring to the
senses alone).
8§ 92, trans. modified. On the judge-
ment of the ears, see the dissertation of
Baumgarten’s follower Dommerich 1746.
9See among others Fauser 1986, 110 ff.
10Sforza Pallavicino 1834, 593. See in
general Summers 1987; Ferraris 1994.
11Muratori 1708, 13.
12In the wake of Muratori’s plea, an ‘Ac-
cademia del Buon Gusto’ was founded in
Palermo in 1718, see Verga 1999, 460 ff.
13Du Bos 1719, 305-321. Baumgarten
held a copy of Du Bos’s work in his per-
sonal library, see Catalogus 1762, 23.
14Bel 1726, 230. The debate Du Bos-Bel
was mentioned in Johann Ulrich König’s
investigation of good taste that Baum-
garten certainly knew, see König 1727,
275-276.
15Albeit never recorded by scholarship,
the bulk of these lectures might have been
published in Decker and Dienemann 1737
(see also Baumgarten’s gratulatory letter,
where Dienemann seems to be one of his
students, H2), as suggested by Heynatz
1771, 70-71 and Boysen 1795, 133, who
claims that Baumgarten authored a work
with the same title as that published by
Decker and Dienemann. For the course on
Isaiah see Meier 1763, 16.
16Lange and Bohnstedt 1710: Sectio ex-
egetica, § 23. In his essay on taste (1727),
König had mentioned this term in order to
argue, among other things, that it was al-
ready used in a metaphorical sense among
the Jews. Also, the plural te’amim is
the name of the signs regulating the He-
brew cantillation of the Bible, as if they
gave the holy text a pleasant taste, see
König 1727:241 and 243, footnote. As for
modern commentators, Piselli makes ref-
erence to Edward Castell’s Lexicon Hep-
taglotton (1669), held by Baumgarten in
his library, to point out that ta’am means
both gustare and intelligere (see Baum-
garten 1985, 9-10 and Piselli’s comment to
§ 92). Piselli does not develop further the
issue, which remains for Mirbach a desider-
atum of research, see Mirbach 2002, 609-
610.
17Francke 1693, 160; see Grote 2017, ch.
2.
18Baumgarten 1740, § 44.
19Baumgarten strongly believes in the
significance of the study of Hebrew to phi-
losophy, in particular for containing the fe-
cund seeds of universal philology and for
being an evident example of philosophical
philology, see Baumgarten 1743, § 7.
20This posits the problem of the possible
212
Alessandro Nannini
connection between spiritual and aesthetic
taste in early eighteenth-century Germany,
see Grote 2016; for the importance of this
connection outside Germany, see Szécsényi
2014.
21Baumgarten 2013, § 607.
22For the main exegetical interpreta-
tions, see Shifman 2012.
23König remarked that smell is much
more proximate to taste than sight and
hearing, because of its corporeal apprehen-
sion of its sensible (König 1727, 247-248).
24Baumgarten 1735, 190-191.
25Not by chance, the object of the Mes-
siah’s judgement – the hidden frame of our
mind – goes beyond the ‘äusserer Schein’,
whereas in Alexander the judicandum are
aisthetà themselves. As we shall see,
aistheteria gegymnasmena in an aesthetic
sense take the shape of a ‘mature taste’.
26Baumgarten 1954, § 93.
27See in general Schwaiger 1995, 93-139.
28Wolff 1732. For the aesthetic impact
of this doctrine, see Pimpinella 2001, in
particular 293-294; see also Schenk 2010,
ch. 1.
29Pleasure is the greater, the greater is
the perfection and the more certain is the
judgement whereby we ascribe perfection
to a thing (§§ 516-517).
30See Pimpinella 1996; Mei 2007, in par-
ticular of taste and touch (§ 552). Else-
where (Wolff 1721, §§ 389-393), Wolff
mentions the delectation of all the senses
(apart from touch) and claims that such a
delectation is permitted if the pleasure is
innocent. It is in particular the works of
the artists that should please our senses.
On the fact that poetry can give pleasure
to the ear, see § 391.
31Wolff 1751, §§ 47; 50.
32Wolff 1738, § 15, scholium; see also
Wolff 1720, § 434; Wolff 1732, § 597; Wolff
1752, § 257.
33Wolff 1985, 30.
34Wolff 1751, §§ 47-48.
35Baumgarten 2013, § 425; see also
Wolff 1731, § 225.
36Baumgarten 2013, § 662.
37The perception of a perfection or im-
perfection in general coincides here with
the perception of various aspects of a thing
as harmonising or disharmonising (Baum-
garten 2013, § 607).
38In fact, Baumgarten confirms the dis-
tinction between true and apparent plea-
sures as respectively stemming from true
and apparent goods (Baumgarten 2013, §
655).
39Wolff does not link beauty with the
judgements, hence with the pleasures, of
the senses, not least because he usually
relates them to taste and touch and this
could hardly match the visual paradigm
of beauty endorsed by Wolff, e.g. Wolff
1732, § 544, scholium. The old Wolff
was certainly not unaware that taste is of-
ten linked with beauty, but he polemically
brushes aside the issue: it is no use arguing
about the taste for beauty (de gustu pul-
chritudinis), where one is more devout to
opinion than to truth, as in the ‘idolatrous
worship of the fine letters’ (Wolff 1750, §
251, scholium).
40Baumgarten 2013, § 608.
41On the exercises needed for this mat-
uration, see Malinowski-Charles 2006, 67-
72. Critical aesthetics is ‘the art of forming
taste or the art concerning judging sensi-
bly and presenting its judgement’ (Baum-
garten 2013, § 607; Baumgarten 1740, §
219).
42See Meier 1763, 12. Reusch 1734,
§ 321. It is worth noting that Reusch
was not the only philosopher in Jena dis-
cussing the subject. In ascribing the judge-
ment to the senses, both inner and outer
(Lehmann 1723, 94; 125), Jena professor
Johann Jakob Lehmann, a disciple of Jo-
hann Franz Buddeus, contends: ‘[. . . ] the
musicians with their hearing, by which
they understand the judgement of the ears,
also argue for this very capacity; and
there are also many examples with taste,
smelling and touch, when one judges the
goodness of the wine, the ingredients of a
drug, the goodness of the cloth, etc.’ (97).
This happens when our facultas iudicandi,
one of the three faculties of our intellect,
works in collaboration with the internal
part of our body or with the outer sensory
organs.
43Through the inner sense, we experi-
ence the changes and effects of the other
faculties of the soul (Baumgarten 2013, §
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535; 1750, § 30). According to Baum-
garten, sensus internus is consciousness
in the strict sense, hence both the self-
referential feeling of ourselves through ev-
ery working of our soul and a unifying
power of all our representational activities.
See Hernández Marcos 2014. On his part,
Wolff claims that our apperception is sim-
ilar to taste. While taste tests and dis-
criminates savours, apperception is a sort
of ‘inner taste’ (gustus internus) testing
and discriminating pleasures (Wolff 1750,
§ 152, scholium).
44Baumgarten 1750, § 35; Baumgarten
1907, § 29. As well as being the judge of
beauty as ‘perfectio phaenomenon’, taste
thus monitors the subjective process to-
wards the perfection of sensible knowledge,
hence towards the attainment of beautiful
knowledge (Baumgarten 1750, § 14). In
fact, we can think of a beautiful thing in
an ugly way; and of an ugly thing in a
beautiful way (§ 18).
45This is also true of the expression of
these sensible representations. Taste can
thus also judge the works of the liberal
arts, and more in general all the activities
(cosmetics, fashion, etc.) in which beauty
is relevant (Baumgarten 1907, § 35; Baum-
garten 1740, § 266).
46Baumgarten 2013, § 546.
47Baumgarten 1761, § 331.
48To judge means to take the res sensa
as the subject and something we immedi-
ately perceive in it as the predicate (Baum-
garten 1761, § 320). Intuitive judgements
are singular judgements (§ 318) known
a posteriori (i.e. through experience) (§
315). Intuitive judgements can be ei-
ther observations or experiments (§ 329),
and are therefore crucial to experimental
physics (Baumgarten 1743, § 9). Also, in-
tuitive judgement can be known through
internal experience, as in the case of spiri-
tual experience (Baumgarten 1773, §§ 105-
106). On intuitive judgements, especially
in Wolff, see Holzhey 1970, 91-96; Engfer
1996, 274-283.
49Wolff 1713, ch. 5, § 14; see also Wolff
1728, §§ 703-704.
50See Ferraris 1994; Buchenau 2004.
51For example Wolff 1720, §§ 374; 872.
52Baumgarten 2013, § 612.
53§ 640. Extended, because aisthesis in-
cludes here all the sensible powers of the
mind. In this way, the inferential power
of the vis aestimativa is directly ascribed
to the common operational whole of sen-
sibility. In the judgement of the senses,
the analogon rationis therefore infers on
the basis of intuitive judgements, hence
sense perceptions, rather than of the non-
sensible intentions of sensible objects, as
was the case with the traditional vis aes-
timativa.
54This is crucial for poets who can
thereby speak of dawns and sunsets with-
out being blamed for incurring a fallacy
of the senses, e.g. Baumgarten 1750, §
429. On the fallacies of the senses, see
Schwaiger 2011, 66-69.
55Baumgarten 1907, § 56.
56Since the premise is an intuitive
judgement, taste is ascribed to the
senses (Baumgarten 2013, § 608), with-
out thereby being one with them. It is
to be noted, though, that taste is not one
with the analogue of reason either, since
the inference about perfection is just one
of the multiple inferences the analogue of
reason can carry out. In the aforemen-
tioned example of the sun turning around
the Earth, the analogon rationis judges the
truth rather than the perfection of the phe-
nomenon.
57This also means that the analogon ra-
tionis no longer includes only animal or
animal-like inferences, but also the ca-
pacity of discerning beauty. In turn,
the capacity of discerning beauty will be
in a sense logicised, see Baeumler 1967,
94. While not investigating further its
root, the relationship between taste and
analogon rationis in Baumgarten was pin-
pointed by Böhm 1926:234-235; see also
Hernández Marcos 2014, 85-88.
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